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INTRODUCTION
Private parties discharge critical roles in the Obama Administration, as they have in administrations past.' Examples from the Obama national security' to claims adjudication. 9 Such use of private parties to help implement federal law raises profound questions of constitutional propriety and democracy o-private parties help set governmental policy largely outside the conflict of interest and transparency rules" typified by statutes such as the Hatch Act, 12 Ethics in Government Act, 13 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),1 4 the Sunshine Act," and the Administrative Procedure Act. 16 This article will reexamine whether there should be constitutional constraints on congressional and presidential delegations to private parties and what those constraints might consist of. Although the propriety of the private exercise of public powers rarely has been litigated, the Supreme Court struggled with that question during the New Deal when Congress created a number of innovative governance structures combining public and private entities in an effort to end the Great Depression. When Congress delegates to private entities, the evils of massive delegations to independent agencies seem magnified-private entities are less electorally accountable, less subject to bureaucratic constraints, and may be less motivated to serve the public good than are independent administrative agencies. Moreover, private decisionmaking may escape both judicial review and constitutional restraints. 19 Even after the repudiation of much 1930s era jurisprudence, the Supreme Court on occasion has continued to warn of the special vices of the exercise of public power by private individuals, 2 0 and lower courts as well at times have decried the particular evils of delegations to private parties.
2 ' The few courts to address the issue over the past eighty years have used three doctrinal lenses. First, courts looked to the Due Process Clause as a protection against self-interested involvement by private parties in implementation of federal law. 22 Second, courts used the nondelegation doctrine, particularly during the New Deal, to invalidate a number of delegations to private producer groups." Third, and more recently, 18. 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (criticizing delegation to a private party under the National Recovery Act).
19. The state action doctrine at times imposes constitutional restraints on private actors. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988) (finding that a physician contracted to provide services to a prison is performing a state action because states otherwise could evade constitutional responsibilities by subcontracting services).
20. See, e.g., Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2190 (2010) (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("A basic step in organizing a civilized society is to take that sword out of private hands and turn it over to the organized government, acting on behalf of all the people."); Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 680-81 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that California's system of false-advertising regulation delegates excessive power to private parties that burdens speech); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 804-810 (1987) (addressing problems of self-interested prosecution by a private party); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972) (holding that a state scheme permitting a creditor to obtain a writ based on ex parte allegations delegates too much authority to a private party).
21. See, e.g., Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., concurring) (questioning whether Congress could delegate lawmaking functions to private contractors); City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1999) (invalidating a rule permitting video-system providers to discriminate among cable operators on the ground that such a rule constitutes "a delegation of regulatory authority to impose a cost on another regulatory entity"); Gen. Elec. Co. v academics have suggested that judges turn to the President's appointment and removal authorities to safeguard the public exercise of governmental authority. Individuals appointed by the President and subject to his removal authority presumptively implement the law in a public regarding way, minimizing concern for self dealing. 2 4 None of the three doctrinal formulations, however, specifically addresses the problem of delegation to private parties. The Due Process Clause traditionally has not been relied upon to prevent delegations to private firms, at least as long as property and liberty rights are not directly involved. The nondelegation doctrine is indifferent to the identity of the individual exercising the power-if legislative standards exist, the individual's private status does not come into play. And, only appointments to "offices" trigger the Appointments Clause-appointment of individuals and groups to exercise discrete or episodic functions escapes Article II scrutiny. 25 The lack of fit between the three doctrines and delegation to private parties has obscured the unique status of private party governance.
Accordingly, this Article first argues (as have others) that the exercise of private power at times violates the constitutional principle of accountability. 26 The Constitution does not authorize either Congress or the President to outsource what I term decisional authority to private parties-authority that binds other private parties in the government's name. Private parties are not subject to presidential appointment or removal; nor are they subject to impeachment. Exercise of authority by private parties may escape the checks and balances woven into the Constitution. As a result, individual liberty may be compromised.
The Article then asks whether a doctrine more tailored than those used by the Supreme Court in prior cases can be fashioned. There often is no clear demarcation between the public and private exercise of governmental authority, as many examples from the Obama Administration indicate, from the directors of the majority-owned General Motors 27 to private members of the Federal Open Market Committee, 2 8 and from Kenneth Feinberg as compensation czar 29 to the plethora of security functions contracted out by the Department of Homeland Security. 30 The recent bailouts of AIG, the banks, and GM have blurred the lines between the public and private sectors further.
3 2 The public/private distinction has long bedeviled courts and commentators.
Nonetheless, the Article argues that a doctrine can be fashioned to check untoward delegations of power to private parties. The first doctrinal step should focus on what type or level of authority exercised by private entities is constitutionally problematic. Neither the scope nor subject matter of duties should be determinative. Rather, the nature of the duties delegated should control. As the Supreme Court has held in an analogous context, 33 private parties and entities should not be able to determine the rights of other private parties in the name of the United States, which I referred to earlier as decisional authority.
The second step in a refashioned doctrine should focus on whether the actor should be treated as public or private. The issue is noncontroversial if the individual is appointed in conformance with Article II or receives a federal governmental salary. Such governmental status ensures public accountability and oversight. A label of "private," however, by itself is not necessarily damning. Indeed, as the prior examples attest, it is not always clear whether the entity is public or private, because attributes of both are present. In such cases, the key in determining the propriety of the delegation of decisional authority lies in the applicability of government-wide rules and regulations designed to ensure that public officials discharge tasks in a public regarding way. Those rules and regulations, whether FOIA or the Ethics in Government Act, reflect what we expect from public servants, and so decisions to exempt actors from such constraints make it more likely that the delegation of decisional authority is impermissible. 73 (2010) , available at 2010 WL
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31. The federal government may own over 90% of AIG's common shares after it converts its In short, private parties' exercise of unchecked decisional governmental authority cannot be squared with the constitutional structure. If a challenge arises, courts should not invoke the Due Process, nondelegation, or Article II tests. Rather, they should inquire more straightforwardly whether the authority is decisional and whether the entity exercising such authority is sufficiently removed from governmental checks to be considered private. From that perspective, at least some of the developments in the Obama Administration appear constitutionally problematic.
II. DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE PARTIES
A. Examples from the Obama Administration
Although it is difficult to assess presidential trends after just two years, the Obama Administration seems as willing (and perhaps more) as its predecessors to invite private parties into the government. His administration has been open to utilization of private entities in a variety of areas.
PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD
In the wake of the Enron debacle, Congress created the PCAOB as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200234 to regulate accounting methods and procedures for publicly traded companies. 3 5 Accounting firms must register with the Board and comply with the regulatory standards issued by the Board.
3 6 In addition, the PCAOB conducts inspections of registered accounting firms, both on a regular basis and in response to allegations of noncompliance with its standards. 7 The PCAOB is unique in that its members are appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to five-year terms 3 8 and subject to removal by the Commission for good cause shown. 39 The President can remove members of the SEC for cause, 4 0 which in turn can remove members of the PCAOB only for cause, thus insulating members of the PCAOB more than many other governmental officers from presidential 
removal.
4 ' In establishing the Board's appointment and removal provisions, Congress precluded any direct role for the President. The Obama Administration before the Supreme Court nonetheless defended the constitutionality of the Board against arguments that the appointment and removal provisions violate Article II. 42 In defending Congress's scheme, the Administration circumvented one of the most interesting issues implicated in the case, and one with potentially the greatest impact-Congress ostensibly created the Oversight Board as a private entity outside the federal government, providing that its members were not to be considered "officers[s] . . . or agent [s] for the Federal Government," 4 3 and that the Board itself "shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government."" Indeed, Congress legislated that the salary of the Board members be set in accordance with the private market. 45 Moreover, Congress exempted the Board from FOIA.
4 6 Congress by its own terms had attempted to delegate critical policymaking to a private group. The executive branch as well as petitioner ducked the issue by agreeing that Congress's labeling was immaterial; instead, all that mattered was that the Board members exercised "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States" within the meaning of Buckley v. Valeo, 4 7 and therefore must be considered officers of the United States subject to Article II limitations. 4 8 In Buckley, the Court chose "significant authority" as a threshold for triggering the Appointments Clause, and explained that the term encompassed "broad administrative powers: rulemaking, advisory opinions, and eligibility for funds . . . ."4 By the same token, the Court continued that investigation and information gathering did not rise to the significant authority level. 5 o Hence, by relying on Buckley, the administration stressed that the PCAOB is a public entity, and that the only critical questions to resolve were the propriety of the appointments and removal provisions. The Supreme Court apparently agreed. 54 The open meetings provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act would not apply.
In addition to the advisory role, the bill delegates to the Advisory Panel a more specific function with respect to operation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN). 6 Section 8 invests in the Panel a veto over any changes to the current status of the contract that the Secretary of Commerce would wish to make, including modifications and renewal. Thus, the Panel would have exerted legal authority over the future of the ICAAN contract. To date, the Obama Administration has not addressed the Panel's proposed Section 8 powers.
GLOBAL WARMING BILL
The Administration is supporting the Waxman-Markey bill, which prods the country toward a path to reduce global warming. 58 Section 705 would require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to report to Congress at regular intervals the progress made by the United States to meet its domestic green house gas emission reduction requirements as well as international obligations. 59 Each section 705 report must be reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which may issue its own recommendations.
6 0 Under the bill, an NAS finding that additional reductions are required automatically triggers a presiden- 6 enhanced the authority of the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) that previously had been established to counsel the executive branch about possible violations of civil liberties.' The IOB is a subset of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), which was created to advise the President on a range of security issues. 65 Members of the PIAB are to be drawn "from among individuals who are not employed by the Federal Government" 66 and receive no compensation for their work.
6 7 The PIAB is to "assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection ....
For its part, the IOB also is to investigate and determine whether any executive branch individual has broken the law through its intelligence gathering efforts.
6 9 President Obama's order directed relevant executive branch agencies, headed by officials confirmed by the Senate, to comply with any request for information from the IOB, 70 and also directed the IOB to "forward to the Attorney General information concerning intelligence activities that involve possible violations of Federal criminal laws or otherwise implicate the authority of the Attorney Gen- members apparently need not comply with many government-wide ethics and conflict of interest restrictions.
COMPENSATION CZAR
The Obama Administration, like its predecessor, has appointed sotermed czars to aid in executive branch initiatives.
7 2 The most high profile of these has been Kenneth Feinberg, a New York attorney, who also served as a "czar" under President Bush in compensating the victims of 9/11.11 More recently, Feinberg has set the compensation that executives of entities receiving TARP funds can earn. 
CONTRACTING OUT
President Obama has continued his predecessors' practice of outsourcing a multitude of tasks to the private sector. As with prior administrations, the current administration has outsourced broadly, including the authority to collect delinquent taxes and the responsibility to modernize the Coast Guard's fleet." Moreover, many key aspects of Homeland Security have been outsourced to private entities, 82 including strategy and implementation of efforts to police the border with Mexico. 83 Agencies such as the EPA have relied upon private entities to prepare proposed rules and respond to congressional inquiries. As a whole, President Obama's Administration therefore has followed its predecessors in using private parties where politically feasible. In a variety of ways, Obama's Administration has welcomed the exercise of governmental power by private parties.
B. Brief History of Challenges to Private Delegations
Challenges to the private exercise of governmental power under our federal system have been scant. Most have focused on power exercised by congressional delegates, although increased criticisms have been leveled at the President for outsourcing decisions.
The canonical case is Carter v. Carter Coal Co." There, the Supreme Court considered a statutory scheme in which a majority of miners and producers of two-thirds of the annual tonnage of coal established working conditions that would bind the entire group. 86 The maxi mum hours of work could be set, as well as the minimum wage." The Court explained that " [t] 92 The Court struck down those sections of the NIRA on both nondelegation and Commerce Clause grounds. 93 In so doing, the Court noted the sweeping power exercised by private entities, even though the proposed codes were subject to presidential authorization.
9 4 The Court asked, "would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries?" 95 After acknowledging that Congress understandably might wish to delegate to private parties "because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises," 96 the Court emphatically stated that "[s]uch a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress." 9 7 Nonetheless, courts subsequently have upheld significant decisional powers delegated to producer groups under the Agricultural Marketing dairy farmers for milk products.'" Prior to setting the prices, the Secretary must conduct rulemaking but, before any order can go into effect, the rule must be approved by the handlers of at least fifty percent of the milk covered by the proposed order and at least two-thirds of the affected dairy farmers.'' Dairy farmers and, to some extent, handlers, can veto any proposed milk marketing order, and the threat of a veto affords those groups some say in the formulation of the order.'o 2 The Supreme Court has upheld this and similar delegations because the exercise of governmental power by such private groups is subordinate to the authority of Agricultural Department officials.1 03 The Supreme Court has reasoned, therefore, that no untoward delegation of private authority exists if some type of oversight has been exercised by federal governmental officials.
Congressional delegations to private parties have, on occasion, been more direct. " In 1893, Congress delegated authority to the American Railway Association to establish a mandatory height for drawbars on railroad cars, and legislated that failure to comply with the height requirement subjected the railroad companies to civil penalties."o' The Supreme Court upheld the delegation with little discussion.1 0 6 Congress also has encouraged standard setting by private organizations, subjecting such standards to minimal oversight.o' More directly, Congress has delegated the power to private accreditation organizations to determine hospitals' eligibility for federal funding. 0 This abbreviated history suggests that the examples from the Obama Administration are not unique. Courts have struggled to identify just what it is about the role of private parties in governance that is troubling, while recognizing the substantial benefits that can be attained by incorporating private partners into the government. Congress as well as presidents have utilized private parties to fashion and implement governmental policy.
C. Rationales for Delegation to Private Parties
The examples of private delegations in the Obama Administration and before exemplify the myriad reasons why utilization of private parties in governance is politically attractive. Sharing power with private entities can further goals of tapping private sector expertise, discharging public functions more efficiently, and attaining more legitimacy for the exercise of public power.
Consider Congress's creation of the PCAOB and delegation of authority to the National Academy of Sciences. Both reflect efforts to utilize private expertise in the private sector to help bring relief to press- ing public problems-in the first instance regulation of publicly traded firms and, in the second case, that of global warming. Congress authorized PCAOB members to draw salaries akin to those in the private sector specifically to enlist those individuals to help ensure that there be no repetitions of the Enron debacle. The proposed delegation to eminent members of the NAS reflects an effort to ensure that such scientific knowledge be deployed to help the government attain global warming targets.
At the same time, involving such respected members of the private sector lends more legitimacy to governmental actions. The government can point to resulting regulation and defend it on the basis that it had been reached only through the efforts of private experts, who presumably were among the most knowledgeable in the field. Similarly, enlisting heads of private banks to serve on the FOMC ensures that the Committee can be guided by those with the greatest private sector experience, and that the private banking community will have greater faith in its actions.
Congress's delegations to producer groups during the New Deal embody the same two dynamics. Producer groups presumably know more than the government about their own needs, so it is more sensible for the government to rely upon those groups in determining marketing orders or acreage allotments. Disaffected members of those producer groups may be more accepting of any marketing order if their peers helped formulate the order. A democratic process was open for the members to voice any concerns.
Relying on producer groups arguably is also more efficient. Instead of having to learn the particular detailed conditions in the dairy or meat industries, Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture can rely on those with the most intimate knowledge of those conditions. Similarly, if industry standards are set by those in the industry, as under the National Industrial Recovery Act or in the American Railway Association example, efficiency can be served.
Historical examples of delegations to private parties highlight the many reasons that can lead presidents and congresses to enlist their participation in governance. Private parties can help the government with their expertise and, at times, permit greater efficiency in governmental provision of goods and services. And, such delegations provide political cover for potentially controversial decisions.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE ENTITIES
A. The Constitutional Structure
To some, the exercise of public power by private individuals and groups is not constitutionally problematic. Nothing in the Constitution specifically prohibits Congress or the President from delegating authority to private individuals. Whether through congressional delegation or executive branch outsourcing, many governmental type responsibilities routinely are exercised by private entities and individuals. Medicare claims are assessed, security measures for the military are pursued, and tax deficiencies determined. Moreover, as a policy matter, many have applauded the efficiencies that can arise from shifting services from the public to private sector.
The silence in the Constitution, however, should not be construed as authorization for unlimited delegations to private entities. The Framers' failure to address the exercise of government power by private parties may well have stemmed from their assumption that many such delegations would be unthinkable. Congress can no more delegate its power to private groups to determine tax rates than the President can turn to the same groups to appoint tax commissioners.
Although there has been little analysis about what the Framers may have anticipated with respect to delegations to private parties, the underlying constitutional concern for accountable governance suggests caution. The division of the Constitution into Articles I, II, and III evidences an.intent to limit governmental authority to those three headings, all of which provide a chain of command. Delegations outside the federal government threaten to dilute accountability and obscure that reporting structure.
Moreover, the entire system of checks and balances, so evident in the constitutional structure, argues strongly against some congressional delegation of authority to private parties. The checks of the Appointments and Impeachment Clauses cannot easily be reconciled with delegations to private parties."' Congressional delegations evade the President's appointment and Senate's consent powers. In addition, for both congressional and presidential delegations, the private parties or groups would not be subject to impeachment. The fact that private parties take no oath pledging fidelity to the Constitution highlights that such individuals and groups act outside the government. The Constitution seemingly contemplates that some level of governmental authority be exercised only by those subject to the accountability mechanisms woven within. Thus, the system of separated powers implicitly restricts congressional and presidential delegations to private entities. As Justice Scalia warned decades ago:
I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.'s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, "no win" political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that was set-not because of the scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the three Branches of Government."' To be sure, the Constitution recognizes that Congress can issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal to private parties, 119 but that possibility more closely resembles an authorization for a private cause of action rather than a delegation of decisional authority. Indeed, that Clause can be read as an exception to the implied ban on the exercise of governmental power by private parties. There is no affirmative constitutional authorization for either Congress or the President to share decisional authority with non-governmental actors.
Without teasing out an elaborate theory, suffice it to say that delegations of decisional authority to private individuals and entities are not easily reconcilable with the focus on accountability in the constitutional structure. We expect, or at least hope, that government entities act for the greater good instead of for private gain. And, there are many checks, including those of the Appointments and Impeachment Clauses, that attempt to make that goal a reality. As the Supreme Court recently warned, "The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability . . . . Without a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot 'determine on whom the blame or punishment of a pernicious measure or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall." 1 2 0 Delegation to private entities masks that chain of command. Indeed, the very notion of private exercise of governmental power contradicts our supposition of what is meant by "government": "One can have a government . . . that benefits from expertise without being ruled by experts. Scholars across a wide spectrum of ideologies agree that the Constitution does not empower governmental officials to offload governmental powers to private entities that could in turn exercise those powers outside the constraints faced by public actors.1 2 2 Indeed, in the criminal law context, Chief Justice Roberts recently commented that delegations to private parties should be prohibited because "[a] basic step in organizing a civilized society is to take that sword out of private hands and turn it over to an organized government, acting on behalf of all the people." 12 3 The constitutional framework does not countenance delegation of at least some type of governmental authority to private individuals and groups.
The doctrine should limit presidential as well as congressional delegations to private entities. Courts seldom have examined the limits of presidential delegation to private parties. Given that Congress cannot delegate to Kenneth Feinberg directly to determine executive compensation, may the President or Secretary of Treasury so delegate? If Congress cannot vest in coal organizations the power to fashion workplace rules as in Carter Coal, can the Secretary of Labor recruit coal organizations to fulfill that same role?
Congress under the Subdelegation Act 1 24 has authorized the President to subdelegate functions that Congress delegates to him. But, does general congressional authorization for subdelegation permit a greater role for private parties than if Congress designates the private parties directly? The potential for congressional aggrandizement is less with presidential delegation, but the concern for a lack of accountability remains. Independent contractors are far less accountable to the President and the public than are government officials. The executive branch does not directly manage contractors' discharge of functions. Contractors' actions are subject to fewer checks, less in the limelight, and the reporting structure is more attenuated.
In light of the discussion previously, the Constitution should be indifferent as to whether the exercise of governmental power by private parties stems from Congressional or presidential design.
12 5 The Consti- 125. Of course, if Congress forbids the President from delegating authority to private parties, then the President's authority stands at even a lower ebb. No theory of inherent executive authority to delegate to private parties has been raised and, in any event, would be difficult to square with the constitutional design. tution prohibits private parties from exercising certain type of governmental power in both contexts. Thus, presidential determinations to contract out functions should be subject to the same analysis as for congressional delegations. In both contexts, the Constitution reserves for public officials the power to bind private entities.
Dangers from vesting governmental authority in private producer groups are not merely theoretical. To use one example, under various provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,126 Congress has enlisted producer groups to set the rules that govern the respective producer communities. Marketing orders bind producers of mushrooms, beef, milk and other commodities. 127 Large producers of oranges such as Sunkist successfully pushed for orders limiting the amount of oranges that could be shipped for consumption within the country.1 28 The quota increases growers' revenues at the expense of consumers and, perhaps as importantly, created a new demand for citrus byproducts for the oranges that could no longer be shipped for marketing.1 2 9 Not coincidentally, Sunkist dominated the market for juice and other orange byproducts.
13 0 Large growers obtained a rule that benefitted themselves at the expense of the smaller growers. There, Alabama's legislature had delegated to a Board of independent optometrists the power to investigate and adjudicate allegations of wrongdoing leveled against optometrists, including those employed by retail organizations. 133 To make matters worse, members of the Board previously had filed charges against the employed optometrists for the same conduct that they, pursuant to delegated authority, were to judge. 134 The Supreme Court found that the potential for bias due to the competition between independent and employed optometrists was too great.
13 1 Private parties when implementing delegated responsibilities do not lose their "private" incentives.
Thus, delegation to private entities cannot readily be accommodated with the constitutional principle of accountability. And, the consti-126. 7 U.S.C. § 608c (8) tutional limitation on delegations to private entities is grounded in plausible policy considerations.
In considering potential doctrine, many nonetheless may doubt that the benefits of judicial enforcement outweigh the costs. Other constitutional doctrines, including the nondelegation doctrine, 13 6 are underenforced. The Supreme Court accordingly has stayed its hand in such contexts because it is too difficult to formulate a workable doctrine without needlessly trammeling the choices of the democratically elected Congress or, as in this case, the President as well. Thus, even if the Constitution may cabin delegations to private individuals, the enforcement costs may be too steep, whether because of the linedrawing problems, or because of the need to second guess institutional priorities of Congress. The question, therefore, is whether the Court can fashion a workable doctrine.
B. The Doctrinal Problem
To date, the Supreme Court has assessed the constitutional propriety of the private exercise of governmental authority through three doctrinal lenses. Although analysis under the three doctrinal heads overlap, all fail to tackle the specific problem arising from the private exercise of governmental power.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
At times, the Court has considered whether private individuals' exercise of governmental authority violates the Due Process Clause. Governmental decisions can only be considered fair or impartial if undertaken by officials who are not self-interested. carrier. 1 4 6 The lower court invalidated the system of private adjudication, reasoning that due process required additional procedural safeguards.
14 7 Accordingly, it ordered de novo hearings before an administrative judge of the Social Security Administration.'
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as long as the Secretary directs the carriers to appoint only "an attorney or other qualified individual with the ability to conduct formal hearings and with a general understanding of medical matters and terminology," no risk of erroneous deprivation existed. 149 The fact that the hearing officers were private did not create any untoward risk of self-dealing, particularly because the funds used to satisfy the judgments came from the United States Treasury as opposed to the carriers (and hearing officers) themselves.s 0 The Court did not address whether the delegation to the private party-aside from the procedural due process issue-was problematic.
Moreover, law implementation by private parties does not necessarily impact the property or liberty interests of private citizens. The interest rate calculations made by the FOMC do not affect property and liberty interests of citizens directly. Nor would the determinations of the National Academy of Sciences on global warming necessarily affect property rights, and the finding with respect to law violations by the Intelligence Advisory Board would not affect individuals' liberty interests directly, because any further investigation would rest in the Attorney General's hands. The problem of delegations to private parties does not simply turn on whether the potential conflict of interest is too great, as in Gibson v. Berryhill, but rather on the accountability enshrined by the Constitution.
The Due Process Clause is certainly capacious enough to address the private exercise of governmental power, but it represents a blunt instrument. Court applied the nondelegation doctrine in assessing a challenge to a delegation to a private party-the American Railway Associationexactly in the same manner as it had to a delegation to a governmental entity. 154 Given the extensive delegations upheld to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to protect the public interest,' 55 or to the Federal Power Commission 156 to set the "just and reasonable rate" to charge for natural gas, 157 such agencies exercise considerable discretion in fashioning the subsidiary rules that govern so much of the country. The nondelegation doctrine has not prevented a vast transfer of power from the legislative to executive branch.
Moreover, the issue raised by the private exercise of governmental power is not merely articulation of broad social goals. We are worried as well about whether private parties can fashion policy binding on others, Finally, private delegations might also be reviewed under the President's Article II appointment and removal powers. Delegations to private parties arguably threaten the Constitution in part by circumventing the executive branch control that was designed to protect all individuals from governmental overreaching. From this perspective, the problem is not principally one of standards articulation, as with the nondelegation doctrine,1o but rather one of preserving the political accountability that arises from the Founders' decision to vest centralized control over law enforcement in one chief executive through the appointment and removal authorities. In the absence of such control, governmental authority might be exercised for private, self-interested ends. Article II addresses the concerns of private delegations more than the prior two formulations.
Under the Appointments Clause, presidents enjoy the power to appoint all superior officers of the United States.
16 ' Through the appointment power, presidents can ensure that only officers they approve of are enforcing the law. Article II provides that the President must appoint all superior officers, and that Congress can decide whether to vest appointment authority over inferior officers in the President, 105 (1946) (explaining that it is "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority").
161
. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. heads of departments, or courts of law.1 6 2 There have been disagreements over line-drawing, particularly between superior and inferior officers, 16 3 but consensus exists over the role that the Appointments Clause plays under the Constitution.'" The President's choice of officer influences the exercise of delegated authority. To some extent, presidents therefore stand accountable for the exercise of all authority delegated by Congress. 16 5 In addition, all officers of the United States must take an oath of office to uphold the Constitution. That oath signifies a more profound obligation to the public trust than a mere contractual duty. For serious malfeasance in office, officers can be impeached. Delegations to private parties, as with contractual relations, can be rescinded, but only public officials face the very public removal from office via impeachment. Conformance with Article II defines in part what it means to be a public official.
Congressional delegations of authority to private parties-whether to a union, producer group, or single individual-bypass the presidential appointment authority. If Congress vested authority in the National Academy of Sciences, the resulting execution of the law could not be as readily traced to the President, and his appointment authority would be circumvented. Congress as a whole also would thereby preclude a role for senatorial consent.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has insisted that Congress play no direct role in the appointment of officers. In Buckley the Court considered a congressional measure empowering the Speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate to appoint four members of the newly created electoral commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 166 The Court held that Congress could not participate in the appointment process, either directly or indirectly, 6 7 and noted that the "debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other Congress, in establishing a compact to oversee administration of D.C. area airports, could subject major decisions of that compact to a board of review, consisting of nine members of Congress in their individual capacities as users of the airports. 170 The Court held that the board of review, through its veto power, exercised significant authority under the laws of the United States and hence invalidated the continuing role of members of Congress on the Board."' In the eyes of the Court, the Board was "a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power ... "172 Congressional delegation of power to private individuals cannot easily be reconciled with Article II.
The Supreme Court also has recognized under Article II the President's inherent right to remove any officer subject to his appointment power. Although there has been much litigation over whether that removal authority should be plenary,' 7 3 the Court repeatedly has held that the removal power follows the appointment authority.174 In Myers, the Supreme Court stated that "Article II grants to the President the executive power of the government-i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed . because Congress has been given explicit and plenary authority to regulate a field of activity, it must therefore have the power to appoint those who are to administer the regulatory statute is both novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause"). President must be able to remove a superior officer "on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised." 7 6 Presidents cannot superintend administration of the laws effectively if they cannot, as a last resort, threaten to discharge officials, at least if they are neglectful of their duties. Again, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court stressed the importance of the removal provision in permitting the President "sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.""'Although the Court concluded in the independent counsel case that the removal authority need not be plenary,1 7 1 some form of removal authority was constitutionally required and, together with other control mechanisms, must ensure that the President retain sufficient control to exercise his constitutionally assigned duties.
501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991
9
The removal authority reflects the President's here and now power to affect policy-if he is aghast at what the Attorney General has done, he can remove him or her. And, President Nixon so proceeded in the famed Saturday night massacre by removing from office both Attorney General Elliot Richardson and interim Attorney General William Ruckelshaus in the same night for their refusal to fire Archibald Cox, the special Watergate counsel, from office.Iso This is not to suggest that we should applaud President Nixon's conduct, but rather recognize the practical importance of the removal authority. In the interests of keeping their jobs, officeholders will hew to the policies and procedures favored by the President. Indeed, in the recent Free Enterprise Fund case, the Court focused almost exclusively on the removal authority in holding invalid PCAOB's structure. 1 8 ' The fact that neither the President nor the SEC could remove members of the PCAOB at will, while members of the SEC were themselves protected from at will dismissal, was determinative.1 8 2 To the Court, exercise of close removal authority was critical to ensuring presidential supervision under Article 11.' Otherwise, the President's "ability to execute the laws-by holding his subordinates accountable for their conduct-is impaired. Congressional delegations to private parties may deprive presidents of the removal power. If Congress lodges the power to set standards in a private group, for example, the President cannot remove members of that group from office.
1 5 Under the global warming bill,"' the President could not remove members of the National Academy of Science even if he believed they engaged in misconduct."' Similarly, if Congress designates a particular individual to safeguard security at airports, the President would not be able to remove the individual even if he determined that the individual's conduct jeopardized national security.
More problematically, a congressional threat to withdraw delegation to a particular person or entity may be tantamount to congressional exercise of a removal authority. The officeholder would look only to Congress for direction. The Supreme Court categorically has determined that Congress itself can play no role in the removal of individuals exercising significant authority under the laws of the United States.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar is illustrative. 8 " In invalidating the Comptroller General's role under the GrammRudman-Hollings Act, the Court focused on the critical importance of the removal authority.' Although the President appoints the Comptroller General to a fifteen-year term of office, Congress made the Comptroller General removable at the initiative of Congress for any one of several causes.
19 0 The Court held that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with execution of the laws except by impeachment."' 9 1 The Court explained that "once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends."' 9 2 Otherwise, Congress would be able both to exercise a de facto appointment authority and a removal authority, permitting it to influence the exercise of delegated authority." 9 Indeed, in Myers the Court invalidated Congress's participation in removal of the postmaster.1 94 Viewed with an Article II lens, congressional determinations to delegate decisional authority outside the President's control are suspect. which were "occasional and intermittent." 98 The Court followed that definition in Auffmordt v. Hedden, 99 concluding that a private appraiser evaluating the worth of imported goods at the behest of the government did not hold an office-the appraiser worked for the government only infrequently on an as-needed basis. 2 0 The Court later in Buckley reiterated that "office" required the exercise of governmental authority over a period of time.
Contrast to
2 0 ' Under the "occasional and intermittent" standard, private parties could wield substantial authority without triggering Article H. Congressional delegation to a private group of the power to set standards, for instance, likely would be considered "occasional" and not transform the private group into federal officers. 2 02
Nor would revising the Buckley formulation be cost free. Congress long has delegated enforcement authority to state governmental officials that evade any strictures of the Appointments Clause. For instance, Congress has approved state compacts 203 206 No one could claim that such state officers, in light of their duties, should be considered to occupy federal offices, even though they may all be exercising "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." 2 07
Moreover, the Appointments Clause lens might be underinclusive for a separate reason. Arguably, the President's appointment authority would not be violated if executive branch officials in turn delegate their authority to private individuals and groups. The President appointed the officials in conformance with the Appointments Clause and the officials remain subject to removal for their decisions to delegate, among other actions. Yet, individuals affected by contractors' actions cannot directly hold the government accountable for such conduct, whether through tort or APA review. Contractors are considered "independent" principally because they are not subject to direct supervision of government officials. The Buckley test, therefore, would not prevent executive branch officials from delegating decisional authority to private individuals, much as happened with Kenneth Feinberg.
Some of the examples from the Obama Administration, therefore, may not involve offices. The proposed delegation of authority to the National Academy of Sciences, for instance, is so discrete that no office thereby is created. Similarly, the obligation of the Cybersecurity Panel to review the ICAAN contract would not transform that advisory body into an office. Historically, the delegations to producer groups do not cir- 206. Freeman, supra note 1, at 592-94 (discussing the concept of shared governmental authority between states and federal agencies).
207. The Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 159. Indeed, the Office of Legal Counsel has summarized that the "Appointments Clause simply is not implicated when significant authority is devolved upon non-federal actors." Id.
cumvent the President's appointment power because the groups' duties are not pervasive. The Obama Administration's selection of Feinberg as compensation czar may not have created an office. Indeed, other contracting out decisions might bypass Article II constraints as well.
Thus, strict application of the Article II appointment and removal powers would limit congressional delegations to private parties but not remove all concerns for the private discharge of governmental authority. The Article II perspective would permit private parties in some contexts to exercise binding authority over other private parties. As currently constituted, therefore, Article II does not fully capture the array of delegations that are problematic. 20 8 No doctrine specifically addresses the precise problem raised by private parties' exercise of governmental powers. 20 9 The Due Process, nondelegation and Article II lenses have distorted the problems posed by private parties' participation in governance. Moreover, those doctrines even if applied consistently by courts would not cover many problematic instances of delegations to private parties.
C. Toward a New Doctrine
If a new doctrine is to be formulated, the first determinant is the quantum of authority exercised by private parties that is constitutionally problematic. Not all involvement by private parties should be constitutionally prohibited-private groups and individuals can provide advice or build roads without transgressing the constitutional scheme. The second question, which perhaps is the thorniest, is the extent to which government constraints sufficiently check the individual or entity receiving the delegation. In essence, determining whether the actor is "public" or "private" should not be dispositive given the wide panoply of hybrid governmental structures that exist today. Rather, in any case in which doubt exists as to the "public" status of the entities, the key should be whether the actors in question are subject to enough governmental checks to guard against arbitrary or self-serving conduct. 345, 352 (1974) ). Given the interchangeability of so many functions between the government and the private market, few functions performed by private parties will be subjected to constitutional constraints.
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REQUISITE QUANTUM OF AUTHORITY
Private individuals and entities wield tremendous influence on the administration, whether through lobbying or advice. To the extent that the Constitution limits the ability of private parties to participate in governance, judicial doctrine must ascertain what type of power and influence is permissible. Advice obviously is compatible with the accountability demanded in the Constitution, but when are actions by private parties inconsistent with that accountability principle?
a. Scope
One possibility is to examine the extent of duties. What if individuals and groups only work on a very part-time basis for the government, irrespective of whether they are affecting the rights and duties of outsiders? Members of the National Academy of Sciences and Kenneth Feinberg presumably hold full-time jobs in addition to their work for the federal government. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Buckley intimated that one marker of an "office" under the laws of the United States lay in the extent of duties performed.
Focusing on the extent of duties, however, ignores that private individuals can have a profound effect on others even if only acting in a discrete sphere, as the National Academy of Sciences and Cybersecurity Panel examples suggest. As discussed in analyzing the drawbacks to an Article II approach to delimiting delegations to private parties, what should count is whether outsiders are bound by the determinations of the private delegate. Our concern is whether the private party binds others through that delegation, backed by the coercive force of the government, even if that governmental function is not extensive enough to be characterized as an office.
b. Importance of Area
Another possibility is to vary the test depending upon how key the area is in which the private individual or group works. Perhaps no authority should be delegated in areas that are considered "core" or "inherent."
Indeed, in elaborating the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that some constitutional guarantees attach to core governmental functions, even when they are contracted out. In rare contexts as with the provision of health care in prisons, the Supreme Court has held that constitutional guarantees must attach, no matter whether the actor is consid-ered public or private.
2 10 Under the state action doctrine, there is a small set of actions that must be subject to constitutional constraints.
The core government functions analysis as used in state action cases does not limit the power of the President or Congress to utilize private parties to enforce federal law or implement federal programs. Rather it holds that, when Congress or the President chooses to use private parties, then such private parties must be bound by certain core constitutional restraints. The core government functions test has not been used to prevent delegation ad ab initio.
Focusing on the importance or historical character of the function provided, moreover, seems hopeless. Consider the trend in the local governmental sphere to contract out or privatize toll roads, parking meters, and water supplies-functions most had thought to be governmental.
11
On the federal level, prisons have been privatized, 2 12 and contractors such as Blackwater have been hired to aid in international security.
13
Much of our wars overseas have depended on private contractors.
We have not reached any consensus on what functions are so "core" that they cannot be contracted out by the executive branch or delegated by Congress. Education once was supplied by private parties, then became the province of the government, and now has become in 214 part privatized once again. Reliance on private parties in military contexts has ebbed and flowed throughout our history.
2 15 Judicial decisionmaking may appear to be a core function, and yet the Supreme Court has held that quasi-judicial decisionmaking is appropriate for delegation to private parties.
2 16 Public and private officials largely exercise functions that are indistinguishable. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 44-49 (addressing the cycling of insurance functions under workmen's compensation statutes).
214. For a discussion of the cycling of education of private to public and back to private, see 
c. Nature of Duties Discharged
The key should be the type of authority delegated, not the area or extent. Congress in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (FAIR Act), 2 17 for example, defined an inherently government function not with reference to areas long thought central to the executive branch such as law enforcement but rather by activities that require "either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Governmental authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the Federal Government . . . ." 2 1 8 Similarly, OMB in Circular A-76 has directed that some governmental actions can never be contracted out. 2 19 For instance, the executive branch cannot delegate power that " [blind[s] the United States to take or not to take some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise" or "[s]ignificantly affect[s] the life, liberty, or property of private persons." 2 20
Those rules persuasively focus on the nature of the power granted to the private individual or group. Courts should focus on the power of private individuals and entities to bind others. Of course, private individuals via federal contracts affect others in a wide variety of contexts, whether as security personnel in Iraq or through construction projects domestically. Viewed at its simplest, the question is not whether the entity makes an impact on another through discharge of functions under a federal contract, but whether its action binds others through policymaking delegated by the government. The situation to avoid is not delegated power per se, as with a mercenary army or private engineer, but rather empowering private entities with the power to bind others through the exercise of policy discretion. 22 ' The suggested approach to define the limits of delegation to private parties follows a line of Supreme Court cases assessing the analogous question of when Congress can delegate to one of its constituent parts. In both contexts, the issue is whether entities other than Congress can, 220. Id. In addition, agencies under FAIR also must classify whether employees exercise inherently governmental functions or not, and Congress at times has stepped in to "reorder" agency priorities, usually at the behest of public employee unions. Stan Soloway & Alan consistent with the constitutional framework, bind others through the exercise of policymaking authority.
22 2 As discussed previously, decisional authority refers to the power of individuals to bind others through setting standards, formulating policy, enforcing the law, and approving or vetoing executive branch proposals.
In echoed the Chadha analysis in evaluating the role of congressional members of a Board of Review established to review major decisions with respect to operation of DC area airports. Given that a veto by the Board was binding and reflected a type of policy decision, the Court concluded that the innovative Board of Review structure violated the Constitution. 22 6 Committees of Congress could affect the rights of private parties through advice and influence, but the Court drew the line at any action that more formally has a legal affect on the parties. The Chadha focus on "altering the legal rights, duties and relations" of others has salience in the private delegate context. Private individuals and entities can provide advice, work as initial factfinders, and implement details of federal governmental programs under governmental supervision, but the Constitution does not countenance delegation of the power to make binding decisions.
Unquestionably, a focus on "altering the legal rights, duties and relations" of others eschews any weighing of the functional importance of the private party's role. The suggested approach refers not to any pragmatic evaluation of how influential an individual or group may be, but rather on the formal authority to bind others.
The Supreme Court previously has pursued a similar approach in attempting to determine whether the private delegate possessed the authority to bind others. For instance, in the marketing order cases, if private producer groups cannot impose changes on member producers without the official imprimatur of a government official, then no private 222. Metzger labels such authority as quintessentially "governmental." Metzger, supra note 1. The terminology is different, yet the focus on the need to keep decisional authority in governmental hands is similar.
223. Other courts have adopted the same approach when assessing the legitimacy of a delegation to a private party from an entity within the executive branch. 23 0 Although the Supreme Court in the Schechter case adopted a more functionalist line and stated that the massive power in fact exercised by private trade groups under the NIRA doomed the delegation, more recent courts have hewed the formalist line.
23 1 As Justice Cardozo stated in concurrence in the earlier case, "it is the imprimatur of the President that begets the quality of law" and not the plans forwarded for approval by the trade groups.
2 32 In other words, private groups do not exercise decisional authority if the executive branch holds the formal power to approve whatever is forwarded by the private entity.
23 3 Even though the private groups in effect make law, the required governmental approval makes the delegation acceptable.
Similarly, if Congress provided that private groups prospectively could set standards binding on the industry, a serious private delegation issue would arise, but not if the private group merely suggested the standards to the Department of Agriculture. Discipline meted through the self-regulatory authority of the New York Stock Exchange must be sub- 233. Mandatory arbitration before private arbitrators poses a ticklish example. For generations, the federal government opposed arbitration, but began to relent in the late twentieth century as the movement toward alternative dispute resolution gained steam. Tapping private parties to resolve claims involving the United States cuts close to the principles discussed in the paper. In Union Carbide, the Court noted that the arbitrators were "civilian," 473 U.S. at 590, but did not articulate or raise any particular concern. Nor was any concern raised by the parties on that issue. ject to SEC review.
2 34 This is not to suggest that reliance on private entities as initial government policymakers reflects wise policy. Government officials' utilization of the private sector may resemble abdication more than a constructive partnership. Yet, courts likely will not scrutinize executive branch practice to ascertain when supervision is too lax. Indeed, even if so inclined, courts likely could not distinguish occasions when private parties wield excessive de facto authority from those in which the advice is appropriate. The formal line of decisional authority is easier to police.
Some corroboration for the focus on decisional authority can be gleaned from the approach pursued by the Office of Legal Counsel in considering the "constitutional limitations on employing private contractors or individuals to perform certain tasks now performed by Department of Justice employees." 235 The first set of tasks included program analyst and manager positions responsible for grant activities. The functions included "the development, monitoring and promotion of criminal justice (including drug prevention) . . . and related programs administered by State and local government agencies" as well as "provision of technical assistance to State/local agencies in the form of short-term training on technical matters" and the "dissemination of information
To resolve the issue, OLC first explained that the Appointments Clause in large part guided the decision as to the type of duties that could only be exercised by officers of the United States-those that involved the exercise of "significant authority" within the meaning of Buckley. 237 The OLC continued that: information gathering, investigative, and advisory functions that do not involve final actions affecting third party rights may be performed by private parties or "independent" contractors. Similarly, purely ministerial and internal functions, such as building security, mail operations, and physical plant maintenance, which neither affect the legal rights of third parties outside the Government nor involve the exercise of significant policymaking authority may be performed In the private contractor setting as well, the executive branch cannot delegate decisional authority to private parties. Private prison officials, for instance, cannot make binding decisions on disciplinary matters that result in lengthening confinement. Consider the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Hilario-Paulino v. Pugh.
2 43 A federal prisoner challenged imposition of discipline in a privately operated prison that resulted in extending his stay behind bars.
2 4 The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had contracted with a private group to administer discipline, and it directed the private group to follow BOP policy in making such decisions.
24 5 Of critical importance, the BOP permitted every adversely affected prisoner to appeal the discipline to government decisionmakers.
24 6 As the court stated, "the fact that the BOP provides a final layer of de novo review allays any concerns regarding the delegation of the initial stages of disciplinary proceedings . . . ."24 Contracting out decisions in the prison context otherwise could readily fall afoul of the reconstituted doctrine.
Moreover 
SUFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENTAL CHECKS
In the vast majority of cases, determining whether the private group exercises decisional authority is determinative. But, an increasing number of cases exist in which it is not possible to conclude whether the group in fact is public or private. The constitutionality of such delegations, therefore, would hinge on the label affixed to the group. Individuals who are appointed by the President, take an oath of office, and draw salary are subject to executive branch controls as well as pan-government restrictions such as the Ethics in Government and Hatch Acts. Indeed, officers also are subject to impeachment. We are confident that, for such individuals, adequate accountability is maintained.
The difficulty is that lines between government and non-governmental entities and individuals have become so blurred. The potential arrays of public and private attributes seem limitless. After the first year of the Obama Administration, the federal government owned sixty-one percent of General Motors Administration recently supported a critical role for the National Academy of Sciences in the global warming debate, even though Academy members are neither appointed by the President nor subject to his removal authority. Would the Academy's involvement be considered public because it is working pursuant to a congressional scheme to reduce global warming even if the vast majority of its responsibilities had nothing to do with implementation of federal law? Members of the PCAOB, NAS, and Kenneth Feinberg all boast some attributes of public authority, and yet lack others. Feinberg did not enjoy a full-time government job and may not have been subject to government-wide ethics and conflict of interest restrictions. 2 5 2 On the other hand, the PCAOB's members were appointed by the SEC and work full-time, though the group is exempt from FOIA and its budget is drawn from a "tax" on the accountants it regulates. 2 53 Private contractors, in turn, are paid from taxpayer dollars, yet not directly through the government. They are employed by private entities even when working full time on government projects.
There are any number of ways to ascertain when the entity or individual exercising power should be considered a part of our government structure and thus capable constitutionally of exercising decisional authority. Courts could focus on the formal trappings of office such as salary and oath of office, the intent of the delegator, or on whether the individual or group is bound by the principal bureaucratic checks operating on the vast majority of federal governmental employees. This section considers the salience of each factor by itself, and concludes that individuals and groups should be able to exercise decisional authority when they are formally "public," or when the individual or group acts within the vortex of governmental checks and balances. Conventionally understood labels should not be dispositive.
a. Salary
As an initial matter, consider the question of salary. Those individuals paid by the federal government should be treated as public employees, and are. The commitment of salary reflects a link between the individual and the government, and broadcasts that tasks accomplished pursuant to that salary further governmental goals.
Yet, the opposite is not true. Individuals and groups have worked to implement federal law without a salary. Members of the National Academy of Sciences would not receive compensation for their involvement in global warming. Numerous individuals have served as envoys overseas without pay, bargaining over treaty conditions and seeking the release of citizens imprisoned abroad.
2 54 The mining groups in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. drew no salary for their efforts in setting working conditions. Salary as an indicator of public status is underinclusive. Individuals and groups long have wielded substantial authority under the laws of the United States without pay.
Moreover, there is something circular about the salary issue. When the government pays an individual through an intermediary, as under a contract or grant, the fact that the pay and specifications come from the federal government does not transform that individual from a private to a public actor. The origin of the salary, in other words, is not dispositive in determining which actors should be considered public. In the PCAOB example itself, Congress determined that the PCAOB should be considered private. Neither the executive branch nor the Court deferred to that assessment. Congress presumably cannot be trusted to determine which of its delegates should be considered private, because it otherwise could too readily circumvent constitutional constraints on its action.
Closely connected to the labeling is the question of presidential or congressional selection. To some, the very fact of presidential selection transforms a private individual into a public servant. the individual or entity is to be considered public, and all that the actor does in that capacity should similarly be subject to public scrutiny. If the Appointments Clause is followed, that surely is the case. Every individual appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause should be considered public and can exercise authority delegated from Congress. And, given that the power to remove flows from the power to appoint, potential exercise of the removal authority adds a check on the duties exercised by the presidential delegate. Public appointment and the potential for removal ensure some accountability for the delegate's exercise of responsibility. Presidential appointment and removal (whether direct or indirect as in the PCAOB case itself), therefore, can determine public status.
But the fact of presidential involvement in the selection of an individual should not automatically ensure that the individual or group designated can exercise decisional authority. Congress, after all, discharges an analogous function when it delegates to private parties as would be the case under the global warming bill. A congressional direction to the Cato Institute to exercise a particular function should be no more talismanic than the Obama Administration's direction to Kenneth Feinberg to perform certain functions. By his actions, President Obama has manifested his intent that Feinberg's nomination (via the Secretary of the Treasury) need not be presented to the Senate for its approval. Whether the administration decided that Feinberg retained his private status, or that the duties exercised were not "significant" under Buckley v. Valeo (or, for that matter, whether Congress implicitly had sanctioned the appointment), is beside the point. If courts are to police delegations to preserve individual liberty, the fact of presidential selection should not be determinative. That designation may not sufficiently link the delegate's actions in the public eye to the designating entity. Indeed, all contracting out determinations reflect the executive branch's designation of particular individuals (or, more likely, firms) to perform specified functions. Neither presidential nor congressional involvement in the designation of the individual or entity implementing federal law suffices to confer public status.
Consider, as well, Congress's creation of the United States Railway Association to monitor CONRAIL and issue bonds, among other duties.
25 8 In so doing, Congress provided that a majority of the entity's members were to be drawn from lists of private individuals supplied by the AFL-CIO and Association of American Railroads. 59 Again, no sal- ary was to be paid, and the private members were not to be subject to the regulations circumscribing the conduct of most government officials. Both Congress and the President shared in the process to appoint the officials, but that selection should not, without more, transform the designee into a public official.
Moreover, despite the selection, a private group may wield the removal authority, solely or concurrently with the President. For instance, consider a congressional bill that would have set up an IRS Oversight Board, under which the President was to appoint to the multimember Board a representative of the Internal Revenue Service employees. Once a representative of the Internal Revenue Service employees was terminated from "membership, or other affiliation with the organization" he or she would be removed from the Board. 26 0 The existence of the removal authority wielded by the private entity raises the question of the representative's status-he or she would be beholden both to the President and the private employee group. Thus, although presidential selection combined with removal strongly signals public status, selection by itself may not be sufficient.
Finally, the appointment and removal powers of the President at times are not at issue. Some individuals or groups may implement federal law and yet hold no federal office. As mentioned previously, Buckley suggests that "offices" are reserved for individuals who implement federal law over a sustained period of time. Members of the National Academy of Sciences might be implementing federal authority even if they do not hold federal office, and the same would have been true for the miners in Carter Coal. The key, therefore, is to consider whether other indicia of public status exist even when there is no formal presidential appointment and removal.
c. Public Accountability System
One powerful indicator of public status exists in the individual or entity's conformance to the welter of rules and regulations that are designed to make governmental actors' decisions public regarding. Although these government-wide restraints do not rise to a constitutional level, their applicability has salience in ascertaining whether the individuals or groups involved may, consistent with the Constitution, exercise decisional authority.
For instance, nearly all governmental entities must comply with the More particularly, there are prohibitions to prevent governmental employees from using their positions to enhance their personal finances, including restrictions on receiving gifts. 266 Additionally, government employees are prohibited from using their public office to advance private interests beyond the purely financial, such as political, familial, or other private purposes. 2 67 Governmental employees also face restrictions on their non-work activities, including outside activities and post-government employment. For example, outside of work, employees may not represent 268 or serve as an expert witness for third parties 269 in disputes involving the government, be awarded a government contract, 2 70 or be compensated for teaching, speaking, or writing. 27 ' After leaving the government, executive branch and certain other agency employees are prohibited from communicating with current officials about particular matters. This prohibition is permanent if the employee personally and substantially worked on the matter and lasts for two years if the matter was only pending when the employee worked for the government. and post-employment activities, enforced by the possibility of criminal penalties. 27 While still subject to some of the restrictions that apply to other government employees, temporary employees are not subject to other restrictions 276 or are subject to them in a narrower range of circumstances.
2 77 Taken as a whole, these government-wide restrictions define what it means to be a public employee.
No similar constraints operate on private parties. 27 8 Private parties need not respond to requests for information, need not comply with the conflict of interest rules specified under the Ethics in Government Act and, depending on contract, can leave their employment and work for a competitor at any time. Thus, when Congress or the President delegates authority to individuals who are not subject to these limitations, those delegates are acting akin to private parties.
By contract or grant, the executive branch at times imposes similar constraints upon private contractors. If contractors must disclose information in their possession upon the request of any citizen, must conduct meetings in the open, cannot lobby on certain issues, and work only via government specification, then they more likely should be treated as public entities for purposes of exercising delegated authority. Imposition of the contractual requirements-like those stemming from governmentwide regulations-may lead to a finding of public status. 
276.
See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807(a)(2)(i)(E)(4) (2010) (exempting temporary employees from the prohibition on compensation for teaching, as long as they serve for less than sixty days or the subject is general or concerns ongoing policy or programs.) 277. By contract, therefore, the Bureau of Prisons arguably has transformed private contractors into public employees, at least for purposes of the delegation inquiry. 2 80 Similarly, when contracting out for debt collection, the Department of Education (among others) requires that the private contractors must obey the Privacy Act and follow the Federal Claims Collections Standards and the Department's debt collection regulation.
28 1 In addition, the Department must approve debt collection letters. 2 82 Again, via contract, the Department of Education in part changed the character of its agents-they were no longer exempt from certain government-wide regulations.
28 3 Such constraints in a close case should legitimate the contracting out decision, even if decisional authority is included.
8 4
Justification for this approach stems from the key constitutional criterion of accountability. Delegation of decisional authority should be permitted to entities that are publicly accountable. Although the chain of command may still be blurred, the presence of such government-wide constraints serves as a proxy. For example, we are more assured that private contractors implement the will of executive branch officials when they must respond to FOIA, comply with the Hatch Act, and so forth. Contractors who must adhere to government-wide controls are, at least on the margin, subject to greater oversight and their conduct can be traced by the public more readily to the executive branch officials delegating the authority.
In sum, determining when Congress or the President impermissibly has delegated decisional authority to a private actor can be complex. There should be no dispute in the vast majority of circumstances. Receipt of salary indicates public status, permitting the delegation, although the converse is not true. Moreover, congressional or presidential labeling should not be determinative. If the public status is not clear, the key to upholding a delegation of decisional authority should turn on 279. Kelman, supra note 84, at 183, 435 n.104 (quoting "boilerplate language" from a Bureau of Prisons management contract with a general contractor).
280. In the wake of the spate of bank bailouts in the early 1990s, Congress provided that any FDIC contract employee should be deemed a government employee for purposes of government 284. In a sense, the Supreme Court has followed an analogous route in holding that constitutional guarantees should attach at times no matter whether the actor is private or public. Some type of public accountability must attach to the discharge of certain functions, irrespective of form or label.
whether the individual or entity must comply with the unique sets of constraints, such as FOIA and the Ethics in Government Act, that help define what it means to work in the public sector.
2 85 Distinguishing public from private status in the abstract is not critical.
Courts therefore can formulate doctrine distinguishing those exercises of governmental powers by private entities and individuals that violate the Constitution. By articulating a test to determine what level of authority exercised by private groups is constitutionally problematic, and by determining when individuals and groups are sufficiently constrained by government checks, a workable test can be devised. Unlike in the nondelegation context, a doctrinal test can be applied without intruding too far into the prerogatives of the coordinate branch of government. That test can demarcate permissible from impermissible delegations of authority to private parties and serve as a continual reminder of the limits in the Constitution on the exercise of power by private entities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration likely will continue to rely upon private individuals and entities in governing the country. Integrating the private sector into government can ensure greater expertise and efficiency in managing the public sector and, at the same time, garner support from regulated entities. Nonetheless, the Constitution does not authorize private parties to exercise decisional authority over their peers. The interest in accountability presupposes that only publicly responsible entities affect the legal rights of private parties. Although the Supreme Court's prior doctrinal lenses-Due Process, nondelegation doctrine, and Article II-reflect a first step, they have distorted the constitutional principle at stake. Courts instead should scrutinize such delegations more directly to prevent private parties from exercising decisional authority over others. They should ask first whether the quantum of authority exercised rises to the level of decisional authority and, if so, whether the entity exercising that authority should be considered private, in part due to the absence of government-wide constraints imposed on public employees such as FOIA and the Ethics in Government Act. Recognizing this constitutional limitation on delegations to private parties will ensure that " [o] 
